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The way people think about negative events in their 
lives can contribute to their risk for depression, and 
several unhelpful modes of thinking have been identi-
fied as possible precursors to depressed mood (LeMoult 
& Gotlib, 2019). One such thinking pattern is a negative 
inferential style that involves habitually making global, 
stable, and internal causal inferences about negative 
events and inferring negative consequences and nega-
tive personal characteristics from their occurrence 
(Abramson et al., 1989). Although more than 2 decades 
of research have documented the important role of 
negative inferential style in depression (for a review, 
see Liu et al., 2015), much is still unknown about the 
mechanisms through which inferential style exerts its 
effects on depression. Recently, there has been a grow-
ing appreciation for the joint effects of multiple vulner-
abilities such as attention, interpretation, and memory 
on the generation and maintenance of depression 
(e.g., Everaert & Koster, 2020). Therefore, understand-
ing the interplay between negative causal inferences 
and additional cognitive vulnerabilities is imperative. 
Inferences are similar to interpretations for events but 
are unique in providing personal causal explanations 
for events and, in doing so, put people at risk for 
depression when faced with negative events ( Rubenstein 
et al., 2016). When people make inferences, they con-
template the meaning of an unambiguously negative 
event. Therefore, inferences are an essential link 
between negative contents (i.e., negative events) and 
cognitive processes (i.e., inferential style) that together 
make depressive cognition rigid and unmalleable 
( Vergara-Lopez et  al., 2016). Recent advances in the 
experimental modification of causal inferences 
( Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011) make it pos-
sible to examine the causal mechanisms through which 
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Making negative inferences for negative events, ruminating about them, and retrieving negative aspects of memories 
have all been associated with depression. However, the causal mechanisms that link negative inferences to negative 
mood and the interplay between inferences, rumination, and memory have not been explored. In the current study, 
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congruent manner. Moreover, among participants with high levels of depression, training also affected causal inferences 
they made for an autobiographical memory retrieved after training. Our findings shed light on negative cognitive cycles 
that may contribute to depression.
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negative inferences contribute to negative mood and 
their interplay with other vulnerability factors in 
depression.
In the current study, using a training procedure 
designed to modify causal inferences, we examined the 
causal effects of modifying inferential style on other 
central vulnerability factors in depressed mood. Specifi-
cally, we focused on memory processes and rumination, 
a repetitive mode of thinking about one’s mood and 
symptoms, and assessed whether modifying inferential 
style would affect memory and ruminative thinking. 
Both have been implicated in depression (Nolen- 
Hoeksema et al., 2008) and have been linked to causal 
inferences.
Looking through the eyes of an individual who expe-
rienced a negative life event may clarify the causal 
pathways we propose. Following a negative event (e.g., 
being fired from one’s job), a person with a negative 
inferential style may make the following causal infer-
ences for the event: “I was fired because I am not an 
outgoing person. I am a failure, and I will never be able 
to hold on to a job.” Generating such global and abstract 
explanations for the event may increase negative mood 
as well as ruminative thinking, which similarly involves 
self-focused and global thinking about negative events 
(e.g., “Why do things keep happening to me the way 
they do?” “Why can’t I do things differently?”). Further-
more, this person’s inferential style may affect his or 
her memory for the event and for additional similar 
events. Supporting the proposed link between negative 
inferences and ruminative thinking, cross-sectional and 
longitudinal work has demonstrated that a negative 
inferential style not only interacts with rumination in 
increasing depressive symptoms but also predicts later 
levels of rumination (Ciesla et  al., 2011; Pössel & 
 Winkeljohn Black, 2017; Pössel & Pittard, 2019). Nega-
tive inferences may directly facilitate ruminative think-
ing by “feeding” it with negative content but may also 
indirectly increase ruminative thinking by facilitating 
the more abstract cognition that characterizes rumina-
tive thought (Moberly & Watkins, 2006).
Our thinking concerning the effect of inferential style 
emphasizes memory and is based on a long tradition 
of research on constructive and reconstructive memory 
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; McClelland, 1995). This approach 
argues that memory is not just a cognitive system for 
remembering the past by binding together pieces of 
information. Instead, memory serves to fill gaps left by 
missing pieces and to flexibly combine encoded traces 
to construct plausible representations of past events (De 
Brigard, 2014; Schacter et al., 2007). Accordingly, infer-
ential style may affect memory by influencing both the 
initial experience of the event and its later retrieval. Infer-
ential style may also affect the retrieval of conceptually 
or episodically related events. Indeed, memory is recon-
structed when people generate inferences that are sub-
sequently incorporated into event recall (e.g., Chrobak 
& Zaragoza, 2013; Rindal et al., 2017). Thus, memory 
distortions and confabulations may occur when people 
reconstruct or misremember inferences for an event in 
line with their habitual inferential style. In our example, 
a person with a negative inferential style may recall the 
event as “I was fired from my job because I was not 
outgoing enough.” In doing so, this person misremem-
bers the source of inference—internally generated 
when being fired. In the current research, we predicted 
that training people to hold a positive or a negative 
inferential style would lead them to misremember 
causes for events described in training scenarios in line 
with their newly established inferential habit and, thus, 
in a training-congruent manner.
Reconstructing information in line with one’s infer-
ential habit may facilitate retrieval of other personal 
memories with similar inferences. Specifically, because 
for depressed people retrieval is strongly affected by 
contextual information (Hitchcock et al., 2018), think-
ing about negative events and making related negative 
inferences for these events may cue them to recall past 
events inferred in a similar style. Therefore, we argue 
that for depressed individuals, the memorial effects of 
making negative inferences about an event may extend 
to the recall of causal inferences of other past events. 
These memories may be similarly tainted by negative 
inferences, congruent with the inferences for the events 
that cued their recall. As a result, these memories may 
contribute to an increase in negative mood. In our 
example, people may recall past events in which they 
experienced failure and attributed the failure to not 
being outgoing enough, and, as a result, their negative 
mood will persist. Thus, in the current research, we 
predicted that among depressed participants, the train-
ing effects on memory (as observed in training- 
congruent confabulations in the negative training 
condition) would generalize to their retrieval of nega-
tive autobiographical memories. Therefore, we pre-
dicted that depressed participants would retrieve 
inferences for negative autobiographical memories that 
are aligned with their training condition.
The claims we make about the effects of inferences 
on memory partially mirror and extend previous work 
on the effects of interpretation biases on memory. 
When people interpret ambiguous events as negative, 
these negative interpretations are later remembered 
along with the event, and people misremember the 
event in a negative manner that is congruent with their 
initial interpretation (Hertel et  al., 2008). Although 
inferences and interpretation biases are occasionally 
regarded as similar processes of assigning meaning to 
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events (Hirsch et al., 2016), they are nevertheless dis-
tinct (Giuntoli et al., 2019). Interpretation biases focus 
on what has happened and often refer to systematically 
resolving ambiguity in a benign or a negative manner 
(Hirsch et al., 2016). In contrast, maladaptive negative 
causal inferences are activated in response to unequiv-
ocal negative or positive events (Abramson et al., 2002) 
and focus on why an event has happened, thus color-
ing it with additional meaning. Interpretations and 
causal inferences may overlap when an event is dis-
ambiguated by inferring causes and intentions for 
behavior (e.g., “Your friends come over and leave after 
a short while because they . . . are tired / find you 
boring”). This example illustrates the intersection of 
inference and interpretation but does not represent the 
full scope of either phenomenon.
Evidence for the effects of interpretation on memory 
was obtained in studies employing cognitive-bias modi-
fication for interpretation (CBM-I; e.g., Hertel et  al., 
2014). In these studies, participants trained to interpret 
ambiguous scenarios positively or negatively exhibited 
training-congruent memory biases that reflected their 
interpretations ( Joormann et al., 2015; Tran et al., 2011). 
Thus, inducing an interpretation bias affects the way 
participants encode and later freely recall newly pre-
sented ambiguous events. The memory processes we 
assess in the current research are different. First, 
because the trained causal inferences are made for 
unambiguous events, memory confabulations do not 
refer to the valence of the event but to the causal infer-
ences made about it. Thus, when training inferential 
habit, we expect to affect the recall of previously 
encoded inferences in line with the trained inferential 
style but not memory for the event itself. Second, in the 
current research, memory confabulations do not reflect 
interpretations generated and later recalled by the par-
ticipants. Instead, we assess whether a newly trained 
inferential habit results in confabulations when recall-
ing inferential statements presented along with the 
training scenarios. Such a training effect points to mem-
ory reconstruction (for a similar effect in interpretation 
training, see Salemink et al., 2010). Last, a particularly 
novel aspect of the current research is an examination 
of training effects on recalled inferences about autobio-
graphical memories.
Note that this investigation goes beyond the training 
of inferential style to examine its effect on depressed 
symptoms and mood. A small number of studies have 
used CBM paradigms to test the causal role of negative 
inferences on mood (Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 
2011). In these paradigms, participants are asked to 
imagine themselves as the main character in a series of 
scenarios. The scenarios depict various negative life 
events along with the main character’s causal inferences 
for these events. In the positive inferential style 
condition, participants are led to assign a cause that is 
unstable, specific, and unrelated to negative self-worth, 
whereas in the negative inferential style condition, the 
assigned causes are reversed. Inferences are reinforced 
by asking participants to complete word fragments and 
to answer comprehension questions regarding the 
causes for the events. Unlike CBM-I, the word fragments 
do not serve to disambiguate the event but to focus 
participants’ attention on the trained inference. Recently, 
using these procedures, we showed that participants 
made training-congruent inferences about their failure 
on a cognitive challenge (Avirbach et al., 2019). More-
over, in response to failure, participants’ mood declined 
more if they had been trained to make negative infer-
ences than if training had been positive.
In the present research, we used the same CBM 
procedure to train participants to make positive or 
negative inferences (for a flow chart of the experiment, 
see Fig. 1). We predicted that the training would modify 
participants’ inferential style, replicating our previous 
work. Because in CBM for inferential style participants 
are presented with unambiguously negative events, we 
expected the training itself to affect mood and state 
rumination in line with the training condition (similar 
to Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011). We also 
expected training to affect the recall of inferential state-
ments presented during training. Thus, participants 
should falsely remember inferences concerning the 
training scenarios in a training-congruent manner. 
Moreover, in line with recent work on the effects of 
affective context on retrieval of autobiographical mem-
ory in depression (Hitchcock et al., 2018), we expected 
that among depressed participants, the training effect 
would generalize to the retrieval of a personal memory. 
Thus, we predicted that depressed participants would 
retrieve inferences for a negative autobiographical 
memory in line with their training condition. Finally, 
this depression-related effect of the training on auto-
biographical memory recall is predicted to be reflected 
in similar effects on mood and rumination. We expected 
changes in inferential style to affect emotional vulner-
ability (Grafton et al., 2017). Thus, we predicted that 
among depressed participants, following the autobio-
graphical memory recall, those in the negative training 
condition would report higher levels of negative mood 




Ninety-one undergraduate students1 at the Hebrew 
 University of Jerusalem (native Hebrew speakers) par-
ticipated in the study in return for course credit or 
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payment. Four participants were excluded as a result 
of high error rates (> 30%) on the training task and one 
as a result of incomplete data. Thus, the final sample 
consisted of 86 participants (65 women and 21 men; 
mean age = 23.57 years, SD = 2.26).
Materials
Training paradigm. The training was based on the 
procedure described by Avirbach et al. (2019), and there 
were several modifications designed to enable us to 
examine training effects on memory. The training para-
digm included three types of items: training items, probe 
items, and critical items (for sample items, see the Sup-
plemental Material available online).
The training items included 38 scenarios depicting 
negative events frequently experienced by college stu-
dents (identical across the two training conditions); 
they were equally distributed across social, academic, 
and occupational domains (e.g., “During your freshman 
year in college, university representatives arrive in class 
to describe an interesting new study program. The pro-
gram sounds extremely attractive, and you decide to 
go to the screening day. When the list of accepted 
students is published, you see you are not on it.”). 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the 
main character in the scenarios. Each scenario was 
presented along with a title and a causal inference 
about the event that was congruent with the training 
condition. In the negative-inferences training condition, 
the inferences were internal, stable, and global and 
facilitated inferred negative consequences and negative 
self-worth (e.g., “You think to yourself that if you were 
more intelligent, you would have gotten accepted. Now 
it will be harder for you to get your dream job.”). In 
contrast, in the positive-inferences training condition, 
they were external, unstable, and specific and did not 
facilitate inferred negative consequences and negative 
self-worth (e.g., “You think to yourself that all those 
who arrived at the screening were outstanding students 
and that you will probably have another opportunity 
to take part in a similar program.”). In each scenario, 
participants were instructed to complete two frag-
mented words. Unlike in CBM procedures for interpre-
tation, the presented events were not ambiguous, and 
the fragmented words did not determine the valence 
of the event. Instead, fragmented words were designed 
to focus participants’ attention on the intended causal 
inference (e.g., “if y_u were more intelligent . . . ” vs. 
“ . . . all thos_ who arrived . . . ”). Following each sce-
nario, participants were asked to respond to two yes/
no comprehension questions pertaining to the causal 
inferences. These questions served as a reinforcement 
















Fig. 1. Flow chart of the experiment.
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training fidelity (e.g., “Based on the description, is it 
likely that the cause of the event affects other areas in 
your life?” yes/no).
Six probe scenarios (identical across the two condi-
tions) were distributed throughout the training as a 
measure of training efficacy. These items presented 
negative events, but no causal inferences were included. 
Therefore, participants’ answers to the yes/no compre-
hension questions regarding the causal inference for 
the event reflected their spontaneous causal inference 
and were expected to be training congruent.
Fourteen items, similar in structure to the training 
items, served as critical items to be retrieved later in a 
memory test. To compare training-congruent errors in 
memory (confabulations) across conditions, we con-
structed these items so that they were the same in the 
two training conditions. Half of them consisted of a 
negative event followed by a positive causal inference 
(congruent with the positive-inferences training condi-
tion but incongruent with the negative-inferences train-
ing condition), and the other half consisted of a 
negative event followed by a negative causal inference 
(incongruent with the positive-inferences training con-
dition and congruent with negative-inferences training 
condition).
All item types (training, probe, and critical) were 
followed by two yes/no comprehension questions. After 
each training item, the comprehension question was 
followed by accuracy feedback to enhance training. 
Feedback was provided on only 80% of the comprehen-
sion questions that followed the training items to mask 
differences between training, probe, and critical items.
Training commenced with two blocks of five training 
items each. Following these blocks, seven additional 
blocks were presented; each block consisted of four 
training items and two critical items (one training con-
gruent and one training incongruent). The position of 
the probe items (17th, 24th, 31st, 38th, 45th, and 52nd 
items) was the same for all participants. The specific 
identity of training and critical items that were pre-
sented in each block was determined at random for 
each pair of participants, one assigned to the positive-
inferences training condition and the other to the 
 negative-inferences training condition. This randomiza-
tion scheme ensured that the order of presentation of 
critical items did not differ across the training condi-
tions and would not serve as a confounding variable.
Assessment of memory confabulations. Following the 
training, participants were presented with the title and 
the first sentence of each of the 14 critical items one at 
a time. Participants were asked to recall the event and 
write a description of it and then to recall the cause 
for the event and write it. Participants’ descriptions 
were rated by two independent raters (blind to training 
 condition), and disagreements were resolved by a third 
rater. Although participants were prompted to write sepa-
rate descriptions of the event and the inference, their 
actual descriptions were occasionally mixed. Therefore, 
raters coded the full text in several stages. They first com-
pared the recalled event with the training scenario to 
determine whether the participant recalled the event, and 
misremembered events were not coded further. Then, 
they assessed whether an inference was described and 
whether it was the same as the originally presented infer-
ence. We were mainly interested in instances in which 
participants misremembered the original inference and 
provided confabulated inferences that were either con-
gruent or incongruent with the inferences promoted in 
their training condition. Therefore, these inferences (i.e., 
confabulations) were further coded to indicate whether 
they included information consistent with positive and 
negative inferences. A confabulation was coded as nega-
tive if it contained any of the three features of a nega-
tive inference (global, stable, internal). Likewise, it was 
coded as positive if it contained any of the three features 
of a positive inference (specific, transient, external). Cod-
ing of positive and negative confabulations was separate; 
therefore, each item could have included both types of 
confabulations, and both were counted separately. To 
conclude, four measures were derived from this coding 
process: the number of correctly remembered events, the 
number of correctly remembered inferences, the number 
of events containing confabulated positive inferences, and 
the number of events containing confabulated negative 
inferences. For ratings of the causal inferences, κ was .95.
Autobiographical memory recall. Participants were 
asked to recall and write about a recent personal event 
that took place 2 to 4 weeks before the experiment and 
made them feel remorse or dejection (for a similar pro-
cedure, see Daches et al., 2019). Next, they were asked 
to think about and describe the causes of the event and 
its personal importance as well as the implications of the 
event for their future.
The causal inferences in the autobiographical reports 
were rated by two independent raters (blind to training 
condition) on the three dimensions of causal inferences 
(internality, stability, and globality) using the content 
analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) method 
(Schulman et al., 1989). Disagreements were resolved 
by a third rater. Higher scores reflect a more stable, 
global, and internal causal inference. For CAVE ratings, 
κ was .74, comparable with the original interrater reli-
ability reported by Schulman et al. (1989).
Self-report measures.
Trait measures. Participants completed a set of trait 
measures, including the Beck Depression Inventory–II 
(BDI-II; Beck et  al., 1996; Cronbach’s α in the  current 
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study = .93), the Attributional Style Questionnaire2 
(ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982; Cronbach’s α in the current 
study = .82), and the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; 
 Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Cronbach’s α in the 
current study = .88). Because of our focus on inferences 
for negative events, only the six negative items from the 
ASQ were administered.
State measures. Participants completed state measures 
assessing mood and rumination.3 Mood was assessed 
(as in Avirbach et al., 2019) with three items measuring 
happy mood and three items measuring sad mood (e.g., 
“Right now, I feel sad”; “Right now, I feel happy”). Adjec-
tives were taken from the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). State rumi-
nation was assessed with four items from the Momen-
tary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory4 (MRSI; Mor et al., 
2013): “Right now, I wonder why I always feel the way I 
do.” “Right now, I am thinking: Why can’t I handle things 
better?” “Right now, it is hard for me to shut off negative 
thoughts about myself,” and “Right now, I dwell on nega-
tive aspects of myself that I wish I’d stop thinking about.” 
These items were selected because they do not probe for 
causal inferences. Mood and state rumination items were 
intermixed and rated using a 10-cm-long visual analogue 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). The 
internal reliability for the state measures in the current 
study was good (αs range = .87–.94).
Procedure
Participants completed the BDI-II, ASQ, and RRS online 
up to 9 days (M = 1.78 days, SD = 1.84) before the lab 
session. When they arrived at the lab, they completed 
a set of state measures of mood and rumination. Sub-
sequently, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two training conditions: a negative or a positive-
inferences training condition. After the training, partici-
pants completed another set of state measures (mood 
and rumination), followed by the assessment of training- 
congruent memory confabulations and the autobio-
graphical memory recall task. Then, participants 
completed a third set of state measures (mood and 
rumination). Finally, participants completed a mood-
neutralizing task and were debriefed. On average, the 
experiment took 90 min to complete.
Results
Participant characteristics
For descriptive statistics, see Table 1. Participants in the 
two conditions did not differ in gender ratio or on any 
of the baseline trait and state measures. Although we 
predicted that depression levels would mostly moderate 
training effects on recalled inferences for the autobio-
graphical memory and the subsequent change in mood 
and rumination, to keep analyses consistent, standard-
ized BDI-II scores were included as a covariate in all 
analyses. Significant interactions with BDI-II scores 
were probed using a median split to define groups of 
lower BDI-II scores (M = 3.38, SD = 2.63, range = 0–8) 
and higher BDI-II scores (M = 17.51, SD = 8.52, range = 
9–48). The mean score on the BDI-II was 10.37 (SD = 
9.89, range = 0–48), and 29 participants had scores 
above 13, indicative of mild levels of depression or 
above.
Training fidelity and efficacy
To measure training fidelity, we assessed accuracy lev-
els on the comprehension questions for training sce-
narios. Accuracy rates on the comprehension questions 
were submitted to an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
with condition as a between-subjects factor and standard-
ized BDI-II scores entered as a covariate. High accuracy 
rates were found for both conditions (positive- inferences 
training condition: M = 83.79, SD = 4.49; negative- 
inferences training conditions: M = 85.77, SD = 5.28). 
The main effects of condition, BDI-II scores, and their 
interaction were not significant (all ps > .05). Thus, 
training fidelity was comparable across conditions.
We then examined whether the training was success-
ful in promoting the intended inferential style. To do 
so, we assessed participants’ yes/no responses to the 
comprehension questions on the probe items, which 
reflected participants’ (positive vs. negative) spontane-
ous causal inferences for the events. For descriptive 
statistics, see Table 1. The proportion of positive causal 
inferences (or the reverse for negative) served as an 
index of training efficacy and was submitted to an 
ANCOVA with condition as a between-subjects factor 
and standardized BDI-II scores entered as a covariate. 
The interaction between condition and BDI-II scores 
was significant,5 F(1, 82) = 11.65, p = .001, ηp2 = .13.
To explore the interaction, we used a median split 
to define groups of lower BDI-II scores (M = 3.38, SD = 
2.63) and higher BDI-II scores (M = 17.51, SD = 8.52). 
Probing the interaction using a median split revealed 
that across depression groups, participants made more 
positive inferences in the positive-inferences training 
condition compared with the negative-inferences training 
condition, but this effect was larger among participants 
with higher BDI-II scores, t(39) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 1.95 
(positive condition: M = 0.78, SD = 0.14; negative condi-
tion: M = 0.41, SD = 0.23), than among participants with 
lower BDI-II scores, t(43) = 2.02, p = .05, d = 0.59 (posi-
tive condition: M = 0.72, SD = 0.11; negative condition: 
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M = 0.62, SD = 0.62). Moreover, whereas in the nega-
tive-inferences training condition participants with 
higher BDI-II scores made fewer positive inferences 
than did participants with lower BDI-II scores, t(41) = 
3.19, p = .003, d = 0.98, the two depression groups did 
not differ in the positive-inferences training condition, 
t(41) = −1.52, p = .135, d = 0.47. Thus, although training 
efficacy was demonstrated in both groups, promoting 
a negative inferential style more strongly affected the 
performance of the more “depressed” participants.
Training effects on memory 
confabulations
We first assessed accuracy rates of recalled critical sce-
narios. As expected, all the effects were nonsignificant, 
including the main effects of condition, BDI-II scores, 
and their interaction (all ps > .05). We then assessed 
accuracy rates of recalled inferences. As expected, all 
the effects were nonsignificant, including the main 
effects of condition, BDI-II scores, and their interaction 
(all ps > .05). Thus, as expected, accuracy rates of recall-
ing the critical items did not vary across the two condi-
tions or by BDI-II scores. For descriptive statistics for 
the critical scenarios, including accuracy rates and 
memory confabulations, see Table 1.
To examine the effect of the training, we submitted 
the number of confabulated causal inferences across 
the 14 critical scenarios (both negative and positive, as 
presented) to a mixed-design ANCOVA with factors for 
training condition and judged valence of the recall 
error. Standardized BDI-II scores were entered as a 
covariate. The main effects were nonsignificant, but the 
predicted interaction between condition and valence 
of recall error was significant, F(1, 82) = 113.97, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .582. The three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 82) = 2.15, p = .146, ηp2 = .026.
Aimed at understanding the Condition × Judged Con-
fabulation Valence interaction, we ran t tests that 
revealed that as expected, compared with participants 
in the negative-inferences training condition, partici-
pants in the positive-inferences training condition 
 produced more positive confabulations, t(84) = 7.27, 
p < .001, d = 1.57, and fewer negative confabulations, 
t(84) = −7.78, p < .001, d = 1.68.
To rule out the possibility that this effect can be 
attributed to the effects of training on negative mood, 
we ran the same model with negative mood after train-
ing included as a mediator. Although the direct effect 
of condition on both types of confabulations was sig-
nificant, the indirect effect of training on the recall of 
inferences made for the autobiographical memory via 






ASQ 4.51 (0.80) 4.36 (.71)
BDI-II 10.74 (10.85) 9.49 (7.74)
RRS 45.65 (15.79) 44.35 (11.60)
Proportion of positive inferences  
(training efficacy index)
0.53 (0.24) 0.75 (0.13)
Critical items  
 Number of correctly recalled events 12.65 (1.27) 12.47 (1.33)
 Number of correctly recalled inferences 7.81 (2.44) 8.09 (2.39)
 Number of positive confabulations 1.33 (1.41) 4.28 (2.26)
 Number of negative confabulations 4.51 (2.35) 1.44 (1.08)
 Autobiographical recall CAVE ratings 3.51 (1.33) 3.21 (1.15)
Negative mood  
 Pretraining 19.85 (19.37) 19.32 (19.14)
 Posttraining 31.50 (23.40) 20.85 (18.22)
 Postautobiographical recall 36.96 (27.28) 30.18 (20.86)
State rumination  
 Pretraining 20.82 (21.03) 23.00 (22.14)
 Posttraining 31.42 (25.14) 23.50 (20.87)
 Postautobiographical recall 37.86 (29.66) 30.20 (23.16)
Note: Values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. ASQ = Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson 
et al., 1982); BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck et al., 1996); RRS = Rumination Response Scale (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991); CAVE = content analysis of verbatim explanations; autobiographical recall CAVE ratings = 
autobiographical recall content coding. Higher CAVE ratings represent a more stable, global, and internal inferential style.
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negative mood was not. Thus, training effects on con-
fabulations cannot be attributed to mood. For the full 
results, see the Supplemental Material.
Causal inferences for the recalled 
autobiographical memory
We examined the prediction that participants in the 
negative training condition would make more negative 
causal inferences for their autobiographical memories 
than would participants in the positive-inferences train-
ing condition. To do so, judges’ CAVE ratings of partici-
pants’ causal inferences for their negative autobiographical 
memory were submitted to an ANCOVA with condition 
as a between-subjects factor and standardized BDI-II 
scores entered as a covariate. For descriptive statistics 
for the CAVE ratings, see Table 1. Five participants did 
not describe a specific event, and their data were not 
considered in this analysis.
The only significant outcome was the interaction 
between condition and BDI-II scores, F(1, 77) = 7.18, 
p = .009, ηp2 = .085. Follow-up analyses revealed that 
as expected, participants with higher BDI-II scores in 
the positive-inferences training condition made fewer 
negative causal inferences about their autobiographical 
memory (M = 3.05, SD = 1.21) than did similar partici-
pants in the negative-inferences training condition (M = 
4.03, SD = 1.32), t(37) = −2.42, p = .021, d = 0.78. In 
contrast, participants with lower BDI-II scores in the 
positive-inferences training condition and negative-
inferences training condition did not differ in the nega-
tivity of causal inferences they made about their 
autobiographical memories, t(40) = 0.72, p = .477, d = 
0.22 (positive-inferences training condition: M = 3.39, 
SD = 1.08; negative-inferences training condition: M = 
3.13, SD = 1.23). Thus, recalled causal inferences for a 
past negative event were training congruent among 
participants with higher BDI-II scores but not among 
participants with lower BDI-II scores.
To rule out the possibility that this effect can be 
attributed to the effects of training on negative mood, 
we ran the same model with negative mood after the 
training included as a mediator. Whereas the direct 
effect of condition on CAVE ratings was still signifi-
cantly moderated by levels of depression, the indirect 
effect of training on the recall of inferences for the 
autobiographical memory via negative mood was not. 
For the full results, see the Supplemental Material.
Negative mood
Negative mood scores were submitted to a mixed-design 
ANCOVA with training condition as a between-subjects 
factor, measurement time as a within-subjects factor 
(pretraining, posttraining, postautobiographical recall), 
and standardized BDI-II scores as a covariate. The inter-
action between condition and time was significant, F(2, 
81) = 4.82, p = .010, ηp2 = .106, but the three-way inter-
action between condition, BDI-II scores, and time was 
not, F(2, 81) = 1.37, p = .260, ηp2 = .033 (see Fig. 2).
Analyses within each training condition revealed an 
expected increase in negative mood ratings in the 
 negative-inferences training condition following the 
training, t(42) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 0.71, and an addi-
tional increase from posttraining to postautobiographi-
cal memory recall, t(42) = 2.45, p = .019, d = 0.37. In 
the positive-inferences training condition, negative 
mood did not change following training, t(42) = 0.75, 
p = .454, d = 0.12, but as one might expect, there was 
a significant increase in negative mood from posttrain-
ing to postautobiographical memory recall, t(42) = 3.64, 
p = .001, d = 0.55. Between-groups analyses revealed 
a nonsignificant group difference at baseline, t(84) = 
0.13, p = .899, d = 0.03. However, as expected, a sig-
nificant group difference was found following training, 
t(84) = 2.36, p = .021, d = 0.51, indicative of lower levels 
of negative mood among participants in the positive-
inferences training condition compared with partici-
pants in the negative-inferences training condition. 
Unexpectedly, no significant difference was found at 
postautobiographical memory recall, t(84) = 1.29, p = 
.199, d = 0.28. Thus, whereas in the positive-inferences 
training condition participants’ negative mood increased 
only at postautobiographical memory recall, partici-
pants’ negative mood in the negative-inferences training 
condition increased following both the training and the 
autobiographical recall.
State rumination
State rumination scores were submitted to a mixed-
design ANCOVA with training condition as a between-
subjects factor, measurement time as a within-subjects 
factor (pretraining, posttraining, and postautobiograph-
ical recall), and standardized BDI-II scores as a covari-
ate. The predicted interaction between condition and 
time was significant, F(2, 81) = 4.43, p = .015, ηp2 = .10, 
but the three-way interaction between condition, BDI-II 
scores, and time was not, F(2, 81) = 0.48, p = .621, ηp2 = 
.012 (see Fig. 2).
In analyzing scores within each training condition—
to understand the significant interaction—we found the 
expected posttraining increase in ruminative thinking 
in the negative training condition, t(42) = 3.68, p = .001, 
d = 0.56, and an additional increase from posttraining 
to postautobiographical recall, t(42) = 2.79, p = .008, 
d = 0.43. In the positive training condition, ruminative 
thinking did not change following training, t(42) = 0.26, 
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p = .796, d = 0.04, but there was a significant increase 
in ruminative thinking from posttraining to postauto-
biographical recall, t(42) = 3.27, p = .002, d = 0.50. 
Other analyses revealed no differences between the 
two training groups at baseline, t(84) = 0.47, p = .641, 
d = 0.10; following the training, t(84) = −1.59, p = .116, 
d = 0.34; or at postautobiographical memory recall, 
t(84) = −1.33, p = .186, d = 0.29. Thus, whereas in the 
negative-inferences training condition state rumination 
increased following both the training and the autobio-
graphical recall, in the positive-inferences training 
condition, it increased only at postautobiographical 
memory recall.
 Associations among outcome measures
To examine whether the effect of training on inferences 
was related to training effects on the other outcomes, 
we examined correlations between training efficacy, 
memory confabulations, negative mood, rumination, 
and retrieved inferences on the autobiographical recall. 
Training efficacy (measured by the proportion of posi-
tive responses on the probe items) was negatively 
linked to negative memory confabulations and posi-
tively linked to positive confabulations (see Table 2). 
Likewise, positive confabulations were negatively cor-
related with negative mood and state rumination fol-
lowing the training.
Discussion
The current study was designed to examine the effects 
of inference training on the recall of inferences in 
experimental scenarios, inferences for autobiographi-
cal memories, negative mood, and ruminative thinking. 
Participants’ spontaneous causal inferences for nega-
tive events (probe items) were congruent with their 
training condition. In addition, participants provided 
confabulated memories that consisted of causal infer-
ences of events that were misremembered in line with 
their induced inferential style. As expected, differences 
in mood and rumination were found following the 
training phase. Unexpectedly, group differences in 
mood and rumination were not observed following the 
autobiographical recall procedure. Participants in the 
positive inferential style condition experienced a simi-
lar increase in negative mood and in ruminative think-
ing after recalling a negative personal event, as did 
participants in the negative inferential style condition. 
Note that levels of depression moderated the effect of 
training on recalled inferences for negative autobio-
graphical memories. Thus, only participants with 
higher levels of depression recalled more negative 
inferences about their autobiographical memory in the 
negative compared with the positive-inferences train-
ing condition.
Findings from the current research replicate those in 
previous work (Avirbach et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2011) 
by demonstrating the effects of CBM on inferences and 
showing that CBM can target a negative cognitive style. 
These beneficial effects can pave the way for investiga-
tions involving clinical populations and for the assess-
ment of long-term effects of the training. Indeed, 
despite the centrality of negative inferences to the 
understanding of depression, very few interventions to 
reduce such inferences are available (Marchetti et al., 
2019). Furthermore, being able to manipulate causal 
inferences using an experimental design opens the gate 
to examining inferences as part of the appraisal process 
of events rather than as a trait-like cognitive style. The 
training effect on negative mood and on ruminative think-
ing supports the notion that causal inferences may play 
a role in emotion regulation (Peterson & Park, 2007).
The main contribution of the current work lies in the 
causal linking of inferential style with memory pro-




































Fig. 2. State negative mood (left) and state rumination (right) presented as a function of condition. Error bars represent 
± 1 SE from the mean. Post AMR refers to postautobiographical memory recall.
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processes are in line with previous theory and empirical 
findings concerning depression-related habits of 
thought (Hertel, 2004). Our results may be seen as an 
extension of the combined cognitive bias hypothesis 
of Hirsch et al. (2006) and its application to depression 
(Everaert et  al., 2012) to the domain of inferences. 
Repeated experiences in making negative inferences 
lead people to generate habitual inferences and misre-
member the causes of events in line with their newly 
formed habit of thinking. Such memory errors may have 
significant effects on people’s emotional experiences 
by coloring already negative events in even darker col-
ors. Thus, emotional events are reconstructed in mem-
ory via the inferences people make.
Note that although the habit that was formed among 
participants with lower levels of depression was 
restricted to scenario recall, the ramifications for par-
ticipants with higher levels of depression were more 
substantial. For those participants, repeatedly making 
negative inferences carried over to new circumstances, 
such as when recalling inferences for a past autobio-
graphical negative event. This interplay between infer-
ences and memory retrieval may be seen as an example 
of the negative vicious cycle that characterizes the 
experience of depression. Although dynamic interac-
tions among biases in attention, interpretation, and 
memory have been described as contributing to depres-
sion (Everaert et  al., 2020), negative inferences have 
been typically examined in isolation.
People with depression are characterized by distur-
bances in autobiographical memory: They gravitate 
toward negative memories, have difficulty accessing 
positive memories, and have reduced access to specific 
details of past events (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 
2014). Our findings suggest that autobiographical mem-
ories of people with and without depression may differ 
in additional ways. Having established a habit of nega-
tive inferences, depressed participants retrieved nega-
tive inferences for past negative events.
Two possible mechanisms may have led to this 
retrieval pattern. One possibility is that the training 
affected the selective retrieval of events. Thus, creating 
a habit of assigning negative causal inferences may 
have facilitated the retrieval of events for which the 
person has previously made negative inferences. 
Although we did not assess whether the trained infer-
ential habit contributes to depressed people’s prefer-
ential retrieval of negative (as opposed to positive) 
memories, such an effect would be consistent with the 
selective retrieval mechanism. Furthermore, because 
negative inferential style involves abstract thinking, 
which may impede retrieval of specific memories (Raes 
et al., 2008), the selective retrieval mechanism may be 
related to the reduced autobiographical memory speci-
ficity phenomenon. A second possibility is that the 
causal inference made for the autobiographical memory 
was reconstructed at the time of retrieval in a manner 
comparable with the temporary inferential habit gener-
ated by the training. This possibility suggests that 
although events may be encoded with a causal infer-
ence, the activation of a negative inferential style among 
individuals prone to depression may override this 
encoding, leading to retrieval of a different inference 
that fits the person’s present inferential style. This pat-
tern may explain additional retrieval effects seen in 
depressed people, such as their inability to use positive 
memories as a means for mood repair ( Joormann et al., 
2007). Although we assessed only the recall of negative 
events, the current findings suggest that the additional 
meaning depressed individuals attach to recalled events 
may increase negative mood independently of the 
valence of the event. Clearly, additional research is 
needed to further the understanding of this causal link.
Our predictions concerning training effects on mood 
and state rumination were only partially supported. As 
predicted, repeated processing of events with a certain 
inferential style affected mood and ruminative thinking 
immediately following the training, but it did not carry 
Table 2. Correlations Among Outcome Measures Following the Training
Measure 1 2 3 4 5
1. Training efficacy —  
2. Positive confabulations .39*** —  
3. Negative confabulations −.42*** −.42*** —  
4. CAVE ratings −.07 −.02 .21 —  
5. Negative mood following training −.27* −.22* .17 .31** —
6. Rumination following training −.28** −.13 .08 .34** .81***
Note: Training efficacy was expressed as the proportion of answers to probe items that reflect 
a positive inferential style. Positive confabulations is the number of confabulations containing 
positive causal inferences. Content analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) ratings are judges’ 
ratings of participants’ causal inferences for their negative autobiographical memory.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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over to changes following the recall of a negative auto-
biographical memory. Instead, following the autobio-
graphical recall, participants in both training conditions 
experienced increases in negative mood and rumina-
tion. It is possible that the lack of a filler task to neu-
tralize mood before the autobiographical recall has 
limited the ability to properly examine these changes. 
Moreover, training effects following an emotional chal-
lenge are not always observed (e.g., Joormann et al., 
2015). Such effects depend on the nature of the emo-
tional challenge (Menne-Lothmann et  al., 2014), the 
training paradigm, and the assessment. In our previous 
work (Avirbach et  al., 2019), we reported a training 
effect on mood following the emotional challenge of 
failing a cognitive task. As indicated by a recent syn-
thesis of affect-induction procedures ( Joseph et  al., 
2020), an autobiographical memory recall yields much 
stronger effects on mood than does a failure induction, 
perhaps limiting the training’s capacity to modify the 
emotional response. Furthermore, the timing of the 
assessment following a negative event may be critical 
given that powerful stressors are associated with 
delayed depressive responses (Abela, 2002). Thus, it is 
possible that emotional or cognitive depressogenic 
responses following the autobiographical recall may 
not emerge until later (Perlman & Mor, 2021).
A number of limitations of the current research 
should be noted. First, in Avirbach et al. (2019), we 
assessed training effects on inferential style (target 
engagement) via inferences participants made for new 
scenarios. In contrast, in the current study, we relied 
only on probe items for this purpose. We reasoned that 
the confabulations in recalling training scenarios serve 
as a proxy measure for this purpose, akin to the pro-
cedure used in Hertel et al. (2014). The lack of an 
independent measure that relies on new scenarios may 
limit the ability to gauge whether changes in inferential 
style mediate training effect on additional outcome 
measures. Second, participants were trained to adopt 
either a negative or a positive inferential style, and a 
no-training condition was not included in our design. 
Without a no-training control condition, the source of 
the training effect is undetermined—it can be the posi-
tive training, the negative training, or both, and further 
research should tease these apart. Third, we relied on 
mediational analyses to exclude the possibility that 
training effects on mood accounted for the effects on 
memory. However, allowing mood to dissipate before 
assessing memory, via the use of a filler task, may be 
a more powerful way to eliminate the possible effect 
of mood. Fourth, depression was assessed several days 
before the training session. Although the average inter-
val was short, future research should aspire to further 
minimize the gap between questionnaire administration 
and the experimental session. Fifth, as a result of exclu-
sions, the number of participants in the analyses per-
taining to autobiographical memory fell slightly below 
that required to provide the desired power (i.e., power 
of 80% to reject a false null hypothesis). This underscores 
the importance of verifying in future research, ideally 
using a larger sample, that the presently observed pattern 
of findings is replicable. Finally, considering our promis-
ing and substantial findings with an unselected student 
sample in a single session design, future research should 
examine training causal inferences in a sample of indi-
viduals with clinical levels of depression as well as long-
term effects of multiple session training.
Effective CBM procedures that target depression are 
still needed ( Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Because the cur-
rent training procedure targets cognitive processes cen-
tral to depression, it may offer a promising avenue for 
intervention. Contributing to the potential of this CBM 
procedure is the fact that its training effects have gen-
eralized to the processing of an autobiographical mem-
ory as well as to causal inferences and emotional 
responses concerning a failure experience (Avirbach 
et al., 2019). In addition, changes to causal inferences 
may have ripple effects in decreasing ruminative 
thought and negative memory biases, suggesting that 
causal inferences may be a key point to intervene. 
Together, these effects may contribute to preventing or 
decreasing depression.
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Notes
1. Sample size was based on power analyses in which we 
assumed a medium effect size (d = 0.6) and α value of .05. 
A sample size of 86 provided power of at least 1 − β = .80 to 
detect each of the predicted effects.
2. The ASQ measure was selected over the Cognitive Style 
Questionnaire (Haeffel et al., 2008) because of time constraints. 
It does not assess inferences concerning consequences and self-
worth. However, random assignment to training conditions makes 
a priori group differences in these dimensions highly unlikely.
3. For exploratory reasons, state hope was also measured using 
the Adult State Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1996), but results per-
taining to this measure are not reported here.
4. At the time of constructing this study, the Brief State Rumination 
Inventory (Marchetti et al., 2018) was not yet available.
5. In all analyses, significant lower order effects that were quali-
fied by significant higher order effects are not reported.
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